Abstract. Workflows are complex operational processes that include security constraints restricting which users can perform which tasks. An improper user-task assignment may prevent the completion of the workflow, and deciding such an assignment at runtime is known to be complex, especially when considering user unavailability (known as the resiliency problem). Therefore, design tools are required that allow fast evaluation of workflow resiliency. In this paper, we propose a methodology for workflow designers to assess the impact of the security policy on computing the resiliency of a workflow. Our approach relies on encoding a workflow into the probabilistic model-checker PRISM, allowing its resiliency to be evaluated by solving a Markov Decision Process. We observe and illustrate that adding or removing some constraints has a clear impact on the resiliency computation time, and we compute the set of security constraints that can be artificially added to a security policy in order to reduce the computation time while maintaining the resiliency.
Introduction
Workflows are used in multiple domains, for instance business environments, to represent complex operational processes [7, 14] , or healthcare environments, to represent the different protocols that must be respected [26] . There is also an increasing interest in scientific environments, where platforms like eScience Central [17] allow domain experts to define scientific processes, which are then automatically deployed and executed. Although the exact definition can change from one context to another, a workflow typically consists of a partially ordered set of tasks, where each task must be executed by a user [1] . Workflow designers may have to impose complex security policies, restricting which users can perform which tasks. This includes static user-task permissions but also dynamic constraints, such as separation or binding of duty constraints, which indicate tasks that cannot be performed by the same user [19] , or tasks that must be performed by the same user [9] , respectively.
In general, purely granting an assignment request for a task based on its user permissions and constraints with previously executed tasks may not be enough. Assigning a specific user to a task can prevent the completion of the workflow at a later stage, meaning in general, all possible options have to be considered. Checking that a particular user-task assignment is both valid and allows the workflow to finish is known as the workflow satisfiability problem (WSP) and has been shown to be NP-hard [12, 28] , indicating the runtime assignment process may be computationally demanding.
Workflow resiliency extends the WSP by considering users may become unavailable at runtime, a concept first introduced by Wang and Li [28] . This problem was later refined by Mace et al. [22] , who considered a more quantitative approach, where each user is associated with a probability to become unavailable, and showed that calculating the resiliency of a workflow was equivalent to finding the optimal policy of a Markov Decision Process (MDP). The value returned by the value function of the MDP provides a measure of likely workflow completion. Therefore, evaluating resiliency at runtime can ensure assignments are granted only if the rest of the workflow can be satisfied with a probability above a given resiliency threshold.
Indeed, contrary to the WSP, which can be solved at design time, maximising the resiliency of workflow requires to re-compute at each step the expected resiliency, in order to adjust the user-task assignment to the current availability of the users. Hence, evaluating resiliency for assignments at runtime has itself an impact on workflow execution time. Recent optimising approaches for the WSP, such as [12] , and algorithms and tools, such as model-checking [2] , have been proposed, however, they are not directly concerned with user availability.
In this paper, we investigate how to improve the computation time for the resiliency of a workflow at runtime. In particular, we observe that adding or removing security components to the security policy has a clear impact on the resiliency computation time, that can be either increased or decreased. We therefore propose a methodology to help a workflow designer assess the impact of such policy changes. We apply this methodology to show how to compute the set of security constraints that can be added to a workflow, without impacting the actual resiliency while significantly decreasing the resiliency computation time.
After discussing the related work (Sect. 2) and formally defining the notion of workflow resiliency (Sect. 3), we present the contributions of this paper, which are: the automated analysis of workflow resiliency, using an encoding in the probabilistic model checker PRISM [20] of the theoretical approach presented in [22] (Sect. 4); the empirical assessment of policy changes on the resiliency computation time (Sect. 5); the methodology to calculate a set of artificial security policy constraints, in order to reduce the resiliency computation time while maintaining the actual resiliency value, and its illustration on an example (Sect. 6). We believe that building efficient tools for the analysis of workflows will be helpful to workflow designers, by helping them understanding the complexity of the workflow they are building, and estimating the potential runtime impact of their security policy designs.
Related Work
A number of previous studies on workflow resiliency appear in the literature. Wang and Li took a first step in [28] to quantify resiliency by addressing the problem of whether a workflow can still complete in the absence of users and defined a workflow as k resilient to all failures of up to k users across an entire workflow. Lowalekar et al. in [21] use security attributes to choose the most favourable between multiple assignments exhibiting the same level of k resiliency.
Basin et al. consider the impact of security on resiliency by allowing usertask permission changes to overcome user failure induced workflow blocks, at a quantifiable cost [5, 6] . Wainer et al. also consider in [27] the explicit overriding of security constraints in workflows, by defining a notion of privilege. Similarly, Bakkali [4] suggests overcoming user unavailability through selected delegation and the placement of criticality values over workflows.
A mechanism for the specification and enforcement of workflow authorisation constraints is given by Bertino et al. in [8] whilst Ayed et al. discuss security policy definition and deployment for workflow management systems in [3] . Model checking has been used by Armando et al. [2] to formally model and automatically analyse security constrained business processes to ensure they meet given security properties. He et al. in [15] also use modelling techniques to analyse security constraint impact in terms of computational time and resources on workflow execution.
Herbert et al. in [16] model workflows expressed in BPMN as MDPs. The probabilistic model checker PRISM is utilised to check various probabilistic properties such as reaching particular states of interest, or the occurrence and ordering of certain events. Calinescu et al. use PRISM to evaluate the Quality of Service (QoS) delivered by dynamically composed service-based systems [11] . PRISM has also been used for identifying and recovering from runtime requirement violations in dynamically adaptable application software [10] . Quantitative access control using partially-observable MDPs is presented by Martinelli et al. in [25] which under uncertainty, aims to optimise the decision process for a sequence of access requests.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no current literature neither on automatic analysis of workflow resiliency, nor on the analysis of how changes to a workflow's security policy impact resiliency computation, which is the focus of this paper.
Workflow
In this section we provide our working definition of a workflow and describe the process of assigning users to tasks whilst respecting the security policy, known as the workflow satisfiability problem (WSP). We then describe the notion of workflow resiliency which looks to solve the WSP under the assumption users may become unavailable for future task assignments. 
Workflow Definition
We define here a workflow in similar fashion to Wang and Li [28] and Crampton et al. [12] . A workflow firstly consists of a partially ordered set of tasks (T, <), such that for any two tasks t, t ∈ T , if t < t , then t must be performed before t in any given instance of the workflow. Each task needs to be assigned to a user in a given set U , and such an assignment must respect a security policy. In general, a policy is a triple p = (P, S, B) where:
-P ⊆ U × T is a set of user-task permissions, such that (u, t) ∈ P if, and only if u is allowed to perform t. -S ⊆ T × T is a set of separations of duty, such that (t, t ) ∈ S if, and only if the users assigned to t and t are distinct. -B ⊆ T × T is a set of bindings of duty, such that (t, t ) ∈ B if, and only if the same user is assigned to t and t . Figure 1 illustrates the task ordering over T 1 and Fig. 2 
Definition 1 (Workflow
-P 1 = {(u 1 , t 1 ), (u 2 , t 1 ), (u 2 , t 2 ), (u 3 , t 2 ), (u 1 , t 3 ), (u 2 , t 3 ), (u 2 , t 4 ), (u 4 , t 4 ), (u 1 , t 5 ), (u 4 , t 5 )} -S 1 = {(t 2 , t 4 ), (t 3 , t 4 ), (t 4 , t 5 )} -B 1 = {(t 1 , t 3 )}
Workflow Satisfiability Problem
A workflow assignment is a relation A ⊆ U × T , such that (u i , t i ) ∈ A indicates that user u i is assigned to the task t i . Intuitively, A is valid when i) the task ordering is respected; ii) all assignments are permitted by the user-task permission; iii) separation and binding constraints are respected; iv) no task is executed twice. More formally, given a workflow w = (U, (T, <), (P, S, B)), A is a valid assignment, and in this case we write A w if, and only if the following five conditions are met:
A workflow assignment A is said to be a partial if it does not include an assignment for every task in the workflow. For instance, in our running example, {(u 1 , t 1 ), (u 3 , t 2 ), (u 2 , t 4 )} is a valid partial assignment whereas {(u 1 , t 1 ), (u 2 , t 2 ), (u 2 , t 4 )} is not as it violates the separation of duty constraint between tasks t 2 and t 4 . For a workflow to complete successfully, every task needs to be assigned a user for execution. A workflow assignment A is therefore said to be complete, if, and only if:
The workflow satisfiability problem (WSP) consists of finding a complete and valid assignment, and in some cases can be relatively simple. For instance, consider a policy where S = B = ∅, i.e., where there are no separations or bindings of duty. In this case, it is enough to assign each task t with a user u such that (u, t) ∈ P . If there is no such user, the workflow is unsatisfiable. However, in general, the WSP has been shown to be NP hard [28] , i.e., roughly speaking, finding a complete and valid assignment might require to check all possible assignments. With our running example, imagine we want to find a complete assignment for w 1 and begin assigning users to tasks t 1 ,t 2 and t 4 to form the partial assignment
Although this assignment is valid, there is no user u such that A ∪ {(u, t 3 )} is also valid, meaning that the workflow cannot finish. However with the partial assignment {(u 2 , t 1 ), (u 3 , t 2 ), (u 4 , t 4 )}, we can add (u 2 , t 3 ) and (u 1 , t 5 ) to form a valid and complete assignment.
Workflow Resiliency
Solving the WSP assumes users will always be available for future tasks, however in practice, sickness, vacation, heavy workloads, etc., can cause users to be unavailable for a given user-task assignment. It is important to take this into account when finding A for a given workflow. This is called the resiliency problem, whether a workflow can be satisfied even when some users become absent.
Wang and Li defined an approach to calculate a valid assignment if one exists, that is resilient to up to k users failing, in other words declaring a workflow to be either k resilient or not [28] . This approach is rather binary as in many cases, finding an assignment for a workflow that is resilient to every combination of k user failures may be impossible. Yet finding a valid assignment that is resilient in 9 out of 10 cases is arguably better than choosing a valid assignment that is resilient in only 1 out of 10 cases.
The problem of resiliency adds another level of complexity to the WSP. For instance, consider {(u 1 , t 1 ), (u 2 , t 2 ), (u 1 , t 3 ), (u 4 , t 4 ), (u 1 , t 5 )} w 1 in our running example, where u 4 has a very high probability of failing at or before t 4 . If u 4 does fail, t 4 cannot be reassigned to any other user meaning the workflow cannot finish. If we chose a different assignment
, intuitively the workflow is more resilient as t 4 can be reassigned to u 2 and still finish if u 4 did indeed fail. In [22] , Mace et al. introduce probabilistic user failures and show that computing the optimal policy of an MDP is equivalent to finding A w that maximises the value function. The value function returns 0 < v ≤ 1 if there exists A w where v indicates the probability of the workflow to finish, or 0 otherwise.
Moreover, Mace et al. define in [24] several user availability models and discuss the effects model choice can have on workflow resiliency analysis. In this paper we consider a dynamic user availability model meaning any user who becomes unavailable for a task may become available again at any step later in the workflow.
Computing Workflow Resiliency at Runtime
Although user availability is modelled in a probabilistic way, at runtime, a user is either available or not. In other words, the resiliency of a workflow denotes a prediction of completion, and not a level a completion: a workflow only terminates if all tasks have been assigned to a user available for that task. When the availability of users does not change at runtime, any valid assignment computed before execution remains valid throughout execution. However, when user availability is dynamic, the validity of an assignment might change during the execution, and therefore a new assignment might need to be found.
According to Crampton and Khambhammettu [13] , there are two main workflow execution models: workflow-driven execution model (WDEM), where users are automatically assigned tasks to execute, and user-driven execution model (UDEM), where users initiate requests to be assigned tasks at runtime. The impact of dynamic user availability is slightly different between the two models: with WDEM, intuitively, we want to continuously compute the most resilient assignment, adapting to changes in user availability; Whereas with UDEM, we want to ensure that a user asking to execute a specific task either belongs to the most resilient assignment, or satisfies a threshold of resiliency.
With either model, resiliency might then need to be recomputed at runtime, which can be done by solving a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [22] . There are
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Guard on transition [guard] Fig. 3 . Process computing the resiliency of a workflow, where nextt denotes the set of tasks remaining to be executed. many ways to solve an MDP including dynamic programming (e.g. value iteration) [18] . This technique is provided by the probabilistic model checking tool PRISM, which enables the specification, construction and analysis of probabilistic models such as MDPs [20] . PRISM is an intuitive choice as it can model both probabilistic and non-deterministic choice, and gives an efficient way to solve an MDP whilst providing analysis data regarding computation overheads.
The workflow assignment process is shown as a state diagram in Fig. 3 . Each node represents a process state while each directed arrow between two states s and s indicates a transition from state s to state s . The assignment process works as follows: 1) given a starting state the next unassigned task t in the workflow is selected, where the set of possible tasks is represented by next t . Task selection is in general non-deterministic since several tasks can be the next one (i.e. in the case of parallel execution). If all tasks have been assigned then next t = ∅; 2) When a task t is selected, an arbitrary user u is selected to be assigned to t. The selection of u is non-deterministic as the MDP will essentially try every user for each task assignment.
3) The user-task assignment (u, t) is then checked to see whether it is valid; in other words whether u available and (u, t) satisfies the workflow's security policy p. This check is probabilistic, since user availability is probabilistic. If (u, t) is valid, u is assigned to t and the process starts again with the next task, otherwise the workflow terminates early.
The resiliency of the workflow is therefore computed as the maximal probability of reaching the state Success. We provide an overview of the PRISM modelling language and the full PRISM encoding of our running example in a technical report [23] . In our running example the resiliency is computed to be 51.16 % with the probabilistic user availabilities given in Table 4 , Appendix A.
Empirical Assessment of Policy Changes
In this section we provide an empirical assessment of resiliency computation time to help understanding of how it can be improved at runtime. In doing so we investigate the impact upon computation time of adding security constraints to the security policy. 
Assessment Methodology
We first consider one workflow with 10 tasks and 5 users. For simplicity we only consider the addition of separation of duty constraints which is sufficient to show the changes to resiliency computation time. The maximum number of separation of duty constraints for a workflow of 10 tasks is 45 constraints. For each i where 0 ≤ i ≤ 45 we generate 100 random security policies such that the permissions policy P contains between 2 and 5 users for each task, the separations of duty policy S contains i constraints, and the bindings of duty policy B has 0 constraints. Each policy is applied to the workflow meaning in all we analyse 4500 workflows using a computing platform incorporating a 2.40Ghz i7-4500U Intel processor and 8GB RAM. To take into account any influence the computing platform may have on analysis time, each analysis is repeated 50 times for each workflow and the average values taken.
In terms of user availability we use a dynamic availability model with probabilities of between 0.8 and 1.0 for each user u to be available for a task t (Table 5 , Appendix A) . The resiliency of each workflow is calculated with an unmodified version 4.2.1 of the PRISM model checker using the explicit engine. This is suitable for models with a potentially very large state space, only a fraction of which is actually reachable. A test program has been implemented which, given a number of inputs (number of workflows, tasks, users, etc.) creates the required workflows with randomly generated security policies and generates the corresponding PRISM definition files. Each file is passed in turn to the PRISM model checker which logs the output composed of the resiliency value and other computational values including computation time.
Results
The results shown in Table 1 are given for our workflow with random separation of duty constraints applied, from 0 to 45. To place the workflow resiliency value and its computation time into perspective the following result averages are provided:
-Resiliency : workflow resiliency value -0 % resiliency : number of workflows unable to complete -Computation : time to verify the state Success is reachable (Sect. 4) The following sections provide more detailed analysis of resiliency and computation time.
Resiliency Analysis. Note the resiliency returned by a single execution of a workflow is the same as the average resiliency of 50 executions, in other words the resiliency does not change due to fixed parameters. Each plot in Fig. 4 therefore represents a set of workflows with the same resiliency value and the same number of separation of duty constraints (although each workflow in the set comes with a different set of constraints). Figure 4 shows how in general, resiliency steadily reduces following an incremental introduction of separation of duty constraints. For example, with no constraints, the workflows generally have between 40 and 80 % resiliency and with 20 constraints between 30 and 70 %. All the workflows with between 0 and 10 constraints are shown to be resilient to some degree and up to the point where 20 constraints are applied, all except 1 workflow have some resiliency.
Each plot where resiliency is zero indicates a set of workflows with the same number of separation of duty constraints whose security policy prevents completion. For example, 2 out of 100 workflows with 21 constraints are unable to complete, whilst 36 out of 100 are unable to complete with 30 constraints. No workflow is resilient once 40 constraints have been applied, however some workflows do exist which have some resiliency even with up to 39 out of a possible 45 constraints. The results indicate that some separation of duty constraints can be added or removed with no effect on resiliency.
Computation Time. The overall time to compute the resiliency of a workflow can be separated into the time it takes to construct the PRISM model from the workflow definition (build time), and the time it takes to verify the finishing property holds in model (computation time). If a change is made to the definition before verification, PRISM automatically rebuilds and verifies the model so the total time must be considered. However, once a model has been built and no changes are made, it need not be rebuilt. This is useful where cached, pre-built models can be imagined meaning only computation time need be taken into account when making runtime assignments. It is this time we are interested in improving. Figure 5 shows how in general, the computation time increases and then decreases despite an incremental introduction of separation of duty constraints. The actual times measured are of course somewhat dependent on the efficiency of the model checker used, in this case PRISM. The maximum average computation time is 2.24 s with 11∼15 separation of duty constraints. With zero constraints and 41∼45 constraints the average computation time is 0.11 and 0.04 s respectively. The latter results can intuitively be attributed to the average 0 % resiliency value when all 45 constraints are applied. However, even with 26∼30 constraints and an average 34.85 % resiliency, the average computation time is lower at 0.52 s than the time with 11∼15 constraints. This would indicate the workflows are on average at their most complex in terms of longest resiliency computation time when approximately 11∼15 separation of duty constraints have been applied.
By observing the size of the model that PRISM must solve, in terms of the number of states and transitions, the computation time can be put into context. The maximum average of 2.24 s is the computation time taken by PRISM to solve a model with an average 600287 states and 4.75 million transitions. These two values are the maximum average values recorded for states and transitions respectively. As one would expect, computation time appears to be closely related to the size of the model meaning in order to reduce computation time we must look to reduce the size of the model without losing resiliency. The results do indicate that in some cases separation of duty constraints can be added or removed to a workflow without any loss of resiliency.
Reducing Computation Time
In this section we provide a methodology to calculate a set of dummy security policy constraints (e.g., redundant separation-of-duty constraints or removing unused user-task permissions), in order to reduce the resiliency computation time while maintaining the actual resiliency value.
It was shown in Sect. 5 that in some cases, separation of duty constraints could be added to or removed from a workflow security policy. We are not in a position to say which constraints can be removed as this may weaken the security policy. Therefore we only consider strengthening the policy, in other words adding separation of duty constraints and removing user-task permissions which in effect can be removed at a later stage if necessary without any loss of security. 
Adding Separations of Duty
In our running example workflow w 1 coming with probabilistic user availabilities ( Table 4 , Appendix A), the resiliency is computed to be 51.16 % at an average computation time of 0.11 s, based on the average of 50 resiliency calculations.
Imagine we now add a new separation of duty constraint (t 2 , t 3 ) to give a new policy p 2 = (P 2 , S 2 , B 2 ) where P 2 = P 1 , S 2 = S 1 ∪ {(t 2 , t 3 )}, and B 2 = B 1 . The resiliency of w 1 coming with p 2 is now computed to be 47.89 % at an average computation time of 0.109 s. In other words, the computation time has reduced by 0.001 s but with a loss of 3.27 % resiliency. Now consider adding in turn some alternative separation of duty constraints (t 2 , t 5 ),(t 3 , t 5 ) and (t 1 , t 4 ) to p 1 to give new policies p 3 , p 4 and p 5 respectively. The resiliency values and average computation times are given in Table 2 where +(t, t ) denotes the addition of a separation of duty constraint to p 1 , whilst −(u, t) denotes the removal of a user-task permission from p 1 . The addition of (t 2 , t 5 ) to p 1 (p 3 ) results in no loss to resiliency but increases the average computation time by 0.031 s. Adding (t 3 , t 5 ) to p 1 (p 4 ) results in no loss to resiliency nor any reduction of average computation time. However, adding (t 1 , t 4 ) to p 1 (p 5 ) results in no loss to resiliency yet a reduction to the average computation time of 0.047s .
Removing User Permissions
Similarly we now consider removing a user-task permission (u 4 , t 4 ) to give a new policy p 6 = (P 6 , S 6 , B 6 ) where P 6 = P 1 \ {(u 4 , t 4 )}, S 6 = S 1 , and B 6 = B 1 . The resiliency of w 1 coming with p 6 is now computed to be 39.47 % at an average computation time of 0.047 s. In other words, the computation time has reduced by 0.063 s but with a loss of 11.69 % resiliency.
We now consider removing in turn some alternative user-task permissions (u 4 , t 5 ),(u 2 , t 4 ) and (u 1 , t 1 ) from p 1 to give new policies p 7 , p 8 and p 9 respectively. The resiliency values and average computation times are given in Table 2 . The removal of (u 4 , t 5 ) from p 1 (p 7 ) results in no loss to resiliency but increases the average computation time by 0.011 s to 0.121 s. Removing (u 2 , t 4 ) from p 1 (p 8 ) results in no loss to resiliency nor any reduction of average computation time. However, removing (u 1 , t 1 ) from p 1 (p 9 ) results in no loss to resiliency yet reduces the average computation time by 0.048 s to 0.062 s. These results indicate that a selective addition of separation of duty constraints, or removal of user-task permissions can reduce the resiliency computation time without any loss to the actual resiliency value. 
Calculating Dummy Constraints
With the aid of a larger workflow example, we provide a method of calculating an optimal set of dummy security policy constraints that minimises resiliency computation time without any reduction to the resiliency value. For clarity we calculate two optimal sets, one of redundant separation of duty constraints that can be added to the policy, and one of user-task permissions that can be removed. Our method could easily be modified to calculate a single set of optimal dummy constraints composed of separation and binding of duty constraints, and usertask permissions.
We consider a single base workflow w B with 10 tasks and 5 users, coming with a randomly selected security policy p B composed of 15 separation of duty constraints, 0 binding of duty constraints, and permissions for each task of up to 4 users (29 permissions in total). We use a dynamic user availability model such that each user has an availability for each task of between 0.8 and 1.0 (Table 5 , Appendix A). The resiliency values and computation times of w B and all forthcoming variations of it are analysed 50 times and the average values taken. We also use the same computing platform and PRISM model checker setup as described in Sect. 5.1. The resiliency of w B is calculated as 63.96 % with an average computation time of 6.53 s.
Separations of Duty.
A test program has been implemented which, given a base workflow, e.g. w B , calculates monotonically all possible separation of duty constraint combinations that can be added to the workflow security policy. All combinations include only constraints not already included in the base workflow's security policy. In the case of w B , the maximum number of constraints is 45 meaning up to 30 can be added. All possible combinations of between 1 and 30 constraints are therefore computed. For each of these a PRISM definition file is automatically generated and analysed by the PRISM model checker. Results are logged for resiliency value, computation time and the set of constraints added to w B .
The average results of this analysis step are given in Table 3 where the values given for +s i indicate the average resiliency and computation time for i separation of duty constraints added to w B . Similarly, values for −p i indicate the average resiliency and computation time for i user-task permissions removed from w B . For clarity we only show the impact on computation time of up to 3 additional separation of duty constraints and the removal of up to 3 permissions. In general, adding arbitrary separation of duty constraints in a monotonic fashion is shown to reduce the resiliency computation time but this comes with a reduction in resiliency. Finding a set of dummy constraints that reduces computation time without reducing resiliency value is found from performing an automatic double sort on the results, first by resiliency value (largest to smallest) and then by time (smallest to largest). The set of dummy constraints that does not change resiliency yet gives the lowest computation time for each i additional constraints is shown in Fig. 6 . For example, adding the constraint (t 3 , t 4 ) has on average the minimum computation time for one change, that of 2.58 s. Notice for three additional constraints, adding {(t 1 , t 3 ), (t 3 , t 4 ), (t 3 , t 8 )} achieves the minimal computation time of 1.52 s, thus reducing the original computation time for w B by 5.01 s without lowering its resiliency value.
User-Task Permissions. Similarly to adding separation of duty constraints, the results in Table 3 show in general removing arbitrary user-task permissions in a monotonic fashion reduces the resiliency computation time but with a reduction in resiliency. The set of removable permissions shown to give the lowest computation time for each i permissions removed is given in Fig. 7 . For example, removing the permission (u 5 , t 6 ) has on average the minimum computation time for one change, that of 3.44 s. Notice for three permissions, removing {(u 5 , t 1 ), (u 3 , t 2 ), (u 1 , t 5 )} achieves the minimal computation time of 0.63 s, thus reducing the original computation time by 5.90 s without lowering the resiliency value.
Conclusion
We have shown that the way a workflow security policy is designed has a clear impact on the time required to compute the workflow resiliency, which might need to be done at runtime before the execution of each task, in order to ensure that the user-task assignment is suitable. Our results rely on a systematic encoding of a workflow as a probabilistic model and use the ability of the model checker PRISM to efficiently compute resiliency.
We consider this process to be useful in two settings, firstly the workflow design process allowing domain and security experts to assess how resiliency computation time would be impacted following restrictive and unrestrictive changes to the security policy. Secondly, we have proposed an approach adding dummy or artificial security constraints, in order to reduce the computation time. The gain in time can be significant, for instance in our experiment reducing the computation time from 6.53 s to 0.63 s.
Our experimental results are based on a synthetic workflow, and although it is inspired by real workflows, nothing guarantees that the same efficiency can be gained for all workflows. Hence, we believe our main contribution is the methodology to encode a workflow and to automatically assess its resiliency, based on one of the major probabilistic model-checkers. In the end, the trade-off between resiliency and efficiency can only be resolved by the workflow designer/executer, and we believe that our approach can be helpful in that direction.
In terms of future work we aim to introduce more complex security constraints including cardinality, restricting the number of times a user can be assigned a specific task, to assess their impact on resiliency computation time. We also plan to consider more complex workflows, for instance including loops and choice tasks. These features tend to introduce another level of non-determinism in the execution of the workflow itself, and present as such some challenging aspects in their analysis. 
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